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I. INTRODUCTION
The United States judicial system is premised on the notion of
"equal justice for all." However, as our country has grown and devel-
oped, this notion has become more of an ideal than a reality. In many
cases, the almighty dollar has become the gatekeeper of the courthouse
door. Philosopher and jurist Jeremy Bentham accurately characterized
the situation in Defence of Usury, writing, "[w]ealth has indeed the
monopoly of justice against poverty . . . I
* J.D. Candidate 2007, University of Miami School of Law. I dedicate this Note to my
parents, Dr. Dennis and Maryann Grous, for their example, support, inspiration, and love. You
have given me so much and I am eternally grateful - without the two of you beside me, none of
this would be possible. I also thank A.G. for keeping me grounded and laughing. And, finally, a
special thank you to Professor Robert Eli Rosen for his invaluable assistance with this piece.
1. Letter from Jeremy Bentham, Defence of Usury, Letters I & XII (1787), available at http:/
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In practice, a plaintiff with a strong cause of action may lack the
finances to either pursue the claim or to pay medical bills and other
living expenses during the litigation's pendency.2 She is unable to
obtain money from her attorney, as most states prohibit attorneys from
loaning their clients money for living expenses. Similarly, traditional
lenders generally will not advance the plaintiff funds in exchange for a
share of the litigation proceeds, due to the inherent risk associated with
litigation.4 As a result, she faces a dilemma with two unsatisfactory
alternatives: (1) abandoning the claim altogether; or (2) accepting a
defendant's low settlement offer.5
In the past ten years, this problem has given rise to a new financial
industry, offering advance funding to plaintiffs in return for a share of
the claim's proceeds. 6 As a result of this arrangement, the plaintiff is
able to proceed with her claim and the lender stands to recover their
initial investment in addition to a generous fee.7 On the surface, such a
general description of the industry and its financing arrangements
appears to be advantageous for both parties, in furtherance of the notion
of equal justice to all, and a testament to the entrepreneurial spirit upon
which America was built. However, a more searching analysis of the
industry and its practices reveals a number of unsavory legal and ethical
issues that make one question whether the industry furthers its purported
ideals. Litigation financing's legal and ethical implications are of signif-
icant importance to Florida, a state with a reputation as a hotbed of
plaintiffs' litigation. Florida, like other states, however, neither regu-
lates the litigation financing industry's practices, nor has it created a
specific law with which its courts could find such agreements unenforce-
able.8 In Fausone v. U.S. Claims, Inc., Florida's Second District Court
of Appeal confronted these very issues.9 While recognizing the need for
/socserv2.mcmaster.ca/-econ/ugcm/3113/benthamusury. See also Susan Lorde Martin, Financing
Litigation On-Line: Usury and Other Obstacles, 1 DEPAUL Bus. & COM. L.J. 85 (2002) ("the
ideas that 'wealth [should not have] the monopoly of justice against poverty' has been embraced
as a basic principle in the legal system of the United States") (footnote omitted)).
2. See Martin, supra note 1, at 85.
3. See James E. Molitemo, Broad Prohibition, Thin Rationale: The "Acquisition of an
Interest and Financial Assistance in Litigation" Rules, 16 GEO. J. LEGAL ETmics 223 (2003)
("Black letter lawyer ethics law prohibits lawyers ... from providing most forms of financial
assistance to litigation clients.") (footnote omitted).
4. Martin, supra note 1, at 85.
5. Id.
6. Mike France, The Litigation Machine, Bus. WK. ONLINE, Jan. 29, 2001, http://www.
businessweek.com/2001/01_05/b3717001 .htm.
7. Id.
8. See Fausone v. U.S. Claims, Inc., 915 So. 2d 626, 629 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 2005)
("There appear to be no laws regulating such [litigation financing] agreements in Florida. They
are not treated like consumer loans.").
9. Id.
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plaintiffs to pursue alternative means of financing - such as utilizing
litigation financing companies - the court criticized the agreement's
one-sided terms, which were unsurprisingly favorable to the financing
company. '
Litigation financing companies can tip the scales in what would
otherwise be a David versus Goliath-type situation - with the necessary
cash, plaintiffs need not become victims of a sophisticated defendant
with significant resources. Yet, at the same time, the financing arrange-
ments may simply substitute a new dominant party, the financing com-
pany, leaving the plaintiff a victim just the same. Currently, no specific
law or regulatory device prevents such victimization.
This Note discusses the need for litigation financing regulation in
Florida in the wake of Fausone. The Note begins by presenting a gen-
eral overview of the litigation financing industry's history and structure,
focusing on the industry's growth and development in Florida. Part III
discusses three relevant legal doctrines - champerty, usury, and uncon-
scionability - that have hindered litigation financing's growth and
development. Part IV discusses Fausone v. U.S. Claims, Inc., which
demonstrates industry criticism, as well as highlights the need for
reform. Industry criticism is further discussed in Part V, focusing on a
pertinent 2002 Florida Bar Opinion, as well as arguments presented by
plaintiffs' attorneys and state legislators. The Note concludes by detail-
ing existing initiatives and proposed solutions designed to address these
criticisms.
II. THE LITIGATION FINANCING INDUSTRY
A. The Need for Litigation Financing
During litigation's pendency, plaintiffs often need money to pay
medical bills and living expenses. 1' Florida's Rules of Professional
Conduct,' 2 like those in many other states,13 and the American Bar
10. See id. at 630 ("[A] person who is the victim of an accident should not be further
victimized by loan companies charging interest rates that are higher than the risks associated with
the transaction .... The purchase agreement in this case is one-sided and designed to prevent a
Florida citizen from having access to a local court or another local dispute resolution forum.").
11. See Martin, supra note 1, at 85.
12. See FLA. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 4-1.8(e) (2004) (Mirroring Model Rule 1.8(e)
and stating the general rule that "[a] lawyer shall not provide financial assistance to a client in
connection with pending or contemplated litigation," and providing two exceptions: (1) "a lawyer
may advance court costs and expenses of litigation, the repayment of which may be contingent on
the outcome of the matter;" and (2) "a lawyer representing an indigent client may pay court costs
and expenses of litigation on behalf of the client").
13. See, e.g., ARIz. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. ER-1.8(e) (2004) (following MODEL RULE
1.8(e)); CONN. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.8(e) (2004) (same); but see D.C. RULES OF
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Association's Model Rules of Professional Conduct, 4 prohibit attorneys
from making loans to clients for living or medical expenses. Moreover,
traditional lenders have not been willing to make such loans due to liti-
gation's inherent risks.' 5 Thus, plaintiffs with meritorious cases may be
forced to accept a defendant's low settlement offer, or abandon the suit
entirely. 16 One commentator has described the situation as follows:
As is well-known, should the facts favor a lawyer's side, she argues
the facts; if the law favors the lawyer's side, she argues the law.
Favored by neither, a defense attorney will stall, procrastinate, and
delay .... Nearly without exception, time favors a defendant. Just
three percent of tort cases filed in state or federal court are tried to a
verdict. Some three-quarters of cases are settled. Most plaintiffs set-
tle because they are unable to wait the nearly two years elapsing
before the average case comes to trial.' 7
Similarly, Florida's Second District Court of Appeal recently
observed that:
A person who suffers a severe personal injury will often need money
to take care of herself and her family during the pendency of the
litigation. Lawsuits take time and come with few guarantees. Gro-
cery stores and home mortgage lenders do not wait for payment
merely because a person is unable to work due to an automobile acci-
dent or other injury.' 8
The litigation financing industry has developed to compensate for
this wealth-based disparity and "help relieve the financial pressure of [a]
lawsuit" by providing advance funding.'9 Indeed, the practice has been
characterized as addressing "a social demand crying to be met."20 The
supplied funding allows a plaintiff to pursue a meritorious claim against
a deep-pocket defendant regardless of socio-economic status.
B. History and Development of the Litigation Financing Industry
Litigation financing companies trace their inception to the early
1990s.2" While the identity of the industry's true "creator" is debated, a
PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.8(d) (2004) (authorizing an attorney to pay client medical and living
expenses if reasonably necessary to permit the client to institute or maintain litigation).
14. See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.8(e) (2002).
15. See Martin, supra note 1, at 85.
16. Id.
17. George Steven Swan, The Economics of Usury and the Litigation Funding Industry:
Rancman v. Interim Settlement Funding Corp., 28 OKLA. CITY U. L. REV. 753, 758 (2003).
.18. Fausone v. U.S. Claims, Inc., 915 So. 2d 626, 630 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 2005).
19. Oasis Legal Finance, http://www.oasislegal.complaintifffunding-processl.php (last
visited Feb. 20, 2006) (quoted language appears on main page).
20. See Swan, supra note 17, at 784.
21. Id. at 760.
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number of individuals and groups claim the title. One of them, Perry
Walton, founder of Future Settlement Funding Company, is said to have
discovered the "litigation financing market niche. ' 2 Indeed Walton,
who lacks formal legal education, has since educated over four-hundred
entrepreneurs seeking to gain access to the field. 23  Another group
claiming the title is the LawFinance Group, Inc., the self-described "cre-
ator of the business of litigation financing. ' 24 Regardless of who created
the litigation financing industry, the market has grown considerably
since the late twentieth century.2 ' This growth is due to a number of
factors, among them the ease with which an individual can set up an
internet business, the need for such financing, and the success of the
industry's pioneers.
C. How the Industry Functions
The funding style, including case assessment, amount of funding,
interest rates, and delivery of funding, generally varies from litigation
financing company to litigation financing company.26 The industry
boasts great variety. For example, some firms are distinct in terms of
company management, with attorneys, as opposed to traditional lenders,
running the show.27 Other firms are distinct in the amount of financing
they offer.2 8 While the majority of financing companies are small,
advancing, on average, a maximum amount of $20,000 to individual
plaintiffs, 29 other firms provide hundreds of thousands of financing dol-
lars to individual plaintiffs.3" Despite these differences, however, some
fundamental principles and general practices exist.
Litigation financing companies profess to "help relieve the finan-
cial pressure of [a] lawsuit," by providing a plaintiff with a cash advance
while their claim is pending.3" The plaintiff is supposed to use the
22. George Steven Swan, Economics and the Litigation Funding Industry: How Much Justice
Can You Afford?, 35 NEW ENG. L. REV. 805, 825-26 (2001).
23. Id.
24. See Martin, supra note 1, at 97.
25. See Swan, supra note 22, at 823.
26. Id. at 824. See also Tony Doris, Cash in Advance: Companies that Help Plaintiffs Pay
Bills Until Case Goes to Trial Operate Under Cloud in Florida, MIAMI DAILY Bus. REV., Vol. 78,
No. 15 (July 1, 2003), at 2, available at http://www.westlaw.com (enter citation "7/1/2003
MIAMIDBR 1" under "Quick Research" and select "Go") (noting that "[d]ifferent companies go
about the business in different ways") (page pin citations are to article version available on
Westlaw).
27. See Swan, supra note 22, at 823.
28. Id. at 824-25.
29. Id.
30. Id. at 825.
31. Oasis Legal Finance, http://www.oasislegal.com/plaintiff funding-processl.php (last
visited Feb. 20, 2006) (quoted language appears on main page).
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advance to make "mortgage, car, medical and other essential payments
while they await a judgment or settlement" 32 An overview of the typical
procedure from initial contact to repayment is presented below.3 3
After filing a claim, a plaintiff who needs financial support may
contact one of the many litigation financing companies currently operat-
ing in the United States. Financing companies are generally easy to
locate, with most of the firms operating websites.34 The plaintiff must
then complete a simple application, typically consisting of their name,
contact information, their attorney's name and contact information, the
amount requested, and the case type.35
Once the company receives the application, it will contact the
plaintiffs attorney to obtain documentation relevant to assessing the
case's strengths and weaknesses. 36  Typically, this documentation will
include: (1) the attorney-client retainer agreement; (2) any police, acci-
dent, or incident reports; (3) proof of the defendant's insurance cover-
age; (4) a summary of the medical bills to date; and (5) other materials
that are required for the plaintiffs specific case.37
Based on this documentation, the company, usually through a
panel, makes an assessment of the case's strength.38 As Oasis Legal
Finance's website states,
[f]unding is based on the strength of a case. Our team of legal, busi-
ness and financial professionals carefully reviews the documentation
of each lawsuit to assess the probability of a win at trial or an out of
32. Doris, supra note 26, at 2.
33. See Oasis Legal Finance, supra note 31. This discussion will focus on Oasis Legal
Finance, a litigation financing company headquartered in Northbrook, Illinois. Oasis is a member
of the American Legal Finance Association, the group established by the financing industry to
regulate its members lending practices. See id.
34. See Fausone v. U.S. Claims, Inc., 915 So. 2d 626, 627 n.l (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 2005)
(noting that "[a] search for 'litigation loan' on the internet will rapidly produce the websites of
various organizations willing to buy a portion of a plaintiffs claim").
35. See Oasis Legal Finance, supra note 31 (follow the "Application" hyperlink on Oasis
Legal Finance's homepage).
36. Id. (follow the "Plaintiff Funding" hyperlink; then click "page 2").
37. Id.
38. Id. These panels generally are comprised of legal, business, and financial professionals.
Id. For example, LawFinance Group, Inc., a San Francisco-based financing firm, explains that it
is "staffed with a team of experienced attorneys, who have a solid understanding of both cases on
appeal and the financial issues affecting law practices. As such, they possess far more expertise in
assessing the value of a law firm's portfolio and assets than does the typical commercial bank."
LawFinance Group, Inc., http://www.lawfinance.com (last visited Sept. 25, 2006) (follow the
"Our Company" hyperlink; click "Main;" then scroll to "About Our People"). See also American
Legal Finance Association ("ALFA") FAQs, http://americanlegalfin.com/alfasite2/faqs.asp (last
visited Feb. 20, 2006) ("Each ALFA member employs legal analysts or attorneys who review the
pending case of each applicant by examining legal documents and speaking with the client's
attorney. Only those plaintiffs with meritorious cases and a good likelihood of success become
eligible for advance funding support.").
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court settlement. From that, we determine if your case qualifies for
funding.39
Financing companies generally rely on a number of factors that make a
case suitable for litigation funding. Oasis Legal Finance's factor analy-
sis is representative of the factors other industry participants generally
relied on. These factors include:
Damages. In personal cases, these are generally severe injuries that
cost time off work and other obligations. If this is not the case, we
cannot offer litigation funding.
Liability. It must be clear that the defendant has strong liability for
causing the damage. Liability is a key factor in our decision to offer
a litigation funding.
Ability to Pay. The defendant must have the ability to pay damages
through insurance or other means. If the defendant can't pay a settle-
ment, we can't offer litigation funding.
Contingent Attorney Fee. Your attorney must be compensated from
the proceeds of the case rather than a retainer or hourly fee. He or
she must be willing to assume the risk of winning the case to be paid
for services, just as Oasis is to be repaid for the litigation funding.
Sufficient Margin for Investment. When deciding whether to
extend litigation funding to your case, we consider what other
expenses will be paid from the proceeds of the settlement. These
may include medical bills and liens. We check public records to find
liens on cases we are considering for litigation funding. We need to
assure ourselves there will be sufficient funds available for all parties.
Background. We check records to make sure any past legal pro-
ceedings of the applicant are discharged or explainable and will not
affect the outcome of the current lawsuit before we authorize litiga-
tion funding.
State of Residence. Oasis is able to extend litigation funding in most
states.4 °
This assessment allows the company to decide whether to approve or
decline the plaintiffs funding request, as well as determine the cash
advance amount, assuming the company approves the plaintiffs
request.
4
'
If the funding request is approved, the company then prepares a
Purchase Agreement and forwards it to the plaintiffs attorney.4 2 The
agreement typically includes:
39. Oasis Legal Finance, supra note 31. (follow the "Plaintiff Funding" hyperlink; then click
"page 2").
40. Id. (follow the "Plaintiff Funding" hyperlink; then follow "The Approval Process"
hyperlink) (emphasis in original).
41. Id. (follow the "Plaintiff Funding" hyperlink; then click "page 2").
42. Id. (follow the "Plaintiff Funding" hyperlink; then click "page 3").
2006]
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1. Amount of cash advance;
2. Repayment schedule;
3. Information regarding method of dispute resolution; and
4. Choice of law provisions.43
After the attorney reviews the agreement and explains its terms and
duties to the plaintiff, both the attorney and the plaintiff sign the agree-
ment and return it to the company. an Once the company receives the
executed agreement, it wires the agreed-upon cash advance to the plain-
tiff's designated account.45 In short, the process allows the plaintiff to
sell an interest in their settlement or verdict to the financing company in
return for a cash advance.46
The financing companies emphasize that the entire process can take
"as little as 48 hours, depending on how quickly the cooperating law-
yer's office can submit documentation. 47 Moreover, the executed
agreement leaves open the possibility of obtaining additional advances
during the litigation's pendency, if and when the need arises.4 8
Of course, the financing's contingent nature is a selling point for
plaintiffs. Financing companies emphasize that the plaintiff's repay-
ment obligation plus the fee is contingent upon a favorable settlement or
verdict. The financing company is "repaid out of the proceeds of [the
plaintiff's] case award. There is no risk! If you lose your case you owe
us nothing! 49
Perhaps it is this contingency, or the immediate need for such fund-
ing, or a combination of both factors that makes the company's imposed
fees less threatening or burdensome to the plaintiff. The fee amount
varies not only with respect to the funding company, but also with
respect to the amount advanced.5 ° Some companies, such as Capital
Transaction Group, charge plaintiffs a flat financing fee.5' For example,
under such an arrangement, a plaintiff could be advanced $25,000 with a
43. Id. Unsurprisingly, the latter two provisions tend to favor the financing company, while
proving disadvantageous for the plaintiff-borrower. The agreement at issue in Fausone v. U.S.
Claims, Inc., discussed infra, for example, included provisions providing for arbitration in either
Pennsylvania or Delaware, with Delaware law controlling. Fausone, 915 So. 2d at 628.
However, Ms. Fausone, the plaintiff borrower, was a Florida resident. Id.
44. See Oasis Legal Finance, supra note 31 (follow the "Plaintiff Funding" hyperlink; then
click "page 3").
45. Id.
46. See id.
47. Id.
48. Id. Certainly, the possibility of any additional funding depends on the strength of the
particular case. Id.
49. Id. (follow the "Plaintiff Funding" hyperlink; then follow the "How It's Priced"
hyperlink).
50. Doris, supra note 26, at 3.
51. Id.
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fee of $7,500.52 While all companies would require the plaintiff to
repay the initial $25,000 advance if and when a settlement is reached,
the $7,500 fee may be more, less, or equal depending on the company
and the length of time it takes to reach a case resolution. In fact, some
companies offer a rebate for early case resolution. 3 On the other hand,
other companies increase the fee amount if the case resolution takes
longer than initially expected. 54 This fee commonly amounts to fifteen-
percent of the original cash advance. 5
Other companies use a "multiplier. ' '56 This figure increases by a
certain increment depending on the time it takes for the plaintiff to repay
the advanced funds.57 For example, using a $1,000 advance example, a
plaintiff would need to repay as follows:
Term to Payment Multiplier Client Would Owe
6 months 1.40 $1,400 ($1,000 x 1.40)
12 months 1.60 $1,600
18 months 2.00 $2,000
24 months 2.50 $2,500
42 months 3.00 $3,000
43 months or more 3.50 $3,500
Depending on the company and the transaction, lenders can triple their
investment. 58
52. Id.
53. Id.
54. Id.
55. Id.
56. See Oasis Legal Finance, supra note 31 (follow "Plaintiff Funding" to "How It's Priced"
under "Plaintiff Resources" Section).
57. Id.
58. See Martin, supra note 1, at 99 ("One writer has noted that funding companies commonly
receive gains of a hundred percent or more. Another has said that lenders can triple their
investment.") (citing Jean Hellwege, David v. Goliath Revisited: Funding Companies Help Level
the Litigation Playing Field, TRIAL, May, 1, 2001, at 14; Mike France, The Litigation Machine,
Bus. WEEK ONLINE, Jan. 29, 2001, http://www.businessweek.com/2001/01_05/b3717001.htm).
See also Ronald C. Minkoff & Andrew D. Patrick, Taming the Champerty Beast: A Proposal for
Funding Class Action Plaintiffs, 15 No. 1 PROF. LAW. 1, at *5 (Spring 2004) ("Investors may
receive only a set percentage of total recovery. They may not receive a guaranteed return with
interest .. .or a percentage of the attorneys' fees."). See also Doris, supra note 26, at 2
(According to Thomas H. Ross, President of Palm Beach Capital Advisors, "[t]he average case is
only a $2,500 investment and the average return has been $4,000 and [the company] is getting it in
about 200 days, which computes to a 120 percent annual return.").
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D. The Litigation Financing Industry in Florida
In 2002, Florida's Office of Financial Regulation issued an infor-
mal regulatory opinion declaring that litigation financing companies'
practices violate Florida's anti-usury statute.59 Despite this declaration,
neither the Florida Bar, nor the Florida legislature, took any enforcement
action. 61 "Still, litigation industry officials say the continued regulatory
uncertainty in Florida has led them to limit their business here. 61 Con-
sistent with this uncertainty and hesitancy, "the litigation funding indus-
try is still a fledging one in Florida,"6 2 but many companies have either
incorporated under Florida law or have offices in the state.63
Among these Florida-based companies are Palm Beach Capital
Transactions, of Palm Beach; Fast Funds, Inc., of Miami; Capital Trans-
actions; Advance Settlement; and Legal Advances, Inc., of Aventura.
On the role of litigation financing companies, Len Oliker, managing
partner of Legal Advances, Inc., notes:
It's almost an unfair fight when you put an insurance company up
against an individual and the insurance company stalls his attorney.
[The plaintiff] is going to force his attorney to settle his case as
quickly as possible. We hope to level the playing field.64
Mr. Oliker's perception of his company's role and the benefits it confers
on a plaintiff facing a deep-pocket defendant represents the perception
held by most, if not all, litigation financing companies.65 From the
financing company's perspective, the advance funding it provides the
plaintiff addresses a sincere need and, at the same time, furthers the
idealistic and seemingly unattainable notion of equal justice for all. As
the following discussion evidences, however, this characterization over-
simplifies and overlooks many of the complex and challenging ethical
and legal issues inherent in the industry's practices. While the industry
may serve a genuine need and make justice accessible to a wider class of
litigants, irrespective of their socioeconomic status, the ultimate costs
and burdens imposed on plaintiffs as a result of this advance funding
lead an observer to question whether industry regulation is necessary.
59. Doris, supra note 26, at 3.
60. Id. at 1, 4.
61. Id. at 2.
62. Id. No data is available as to how active the industry is in Florida or as to how much
money has been advanced under such arrangements. Id.
63. Id. at I ("Despite widespread criticism, litigation funding ... [is] proliferating in Florida
... . .)
64. Id. at 2.
65. Id. See also ALFA FAQs, supra note 38 (last visited Feb. 20, 2006) ("The capital
provides support to these victims who face financial constraints - because their injuries may keep
them out of work or their medical bills may steadily increase - and seek funds to handle daily
expenses while they await full resolution of their cases.").
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III. LEGAL ISSUES SURROUNDING THE LITIGATION
FINANCING INDUSTRY
A. Champerty
"Champerty is an ancient doctrine describing an arrangement in
which one person, the champertor, agrees to support another in bringing
a legal action in exchange for part of the proceeds of the litigation. 66
This common law doctrine originated in England. 67  "The power of
influential persons to whom rights of action were transferred in order to
obtain their support and favor in suits brought to assert those rights was
the cause of the rigid doctrine .... -68 Historically, champertous agree-
ments have been prohibited based on fears that such agreements
encourage plaintiffs to bring frivolous litigation, harass defendants, seek
increased damages, and resist settlements. 69 As civilization and the law
evolved, however, the need for such strict rules decreased.7 °
Specifically, in the United States, state legislatures recognized the
inability of some plaintiffs to bring meritorious claims without third-
party funding.7' Accordingly, several exceptions to the champerty doc-
trine have developed, the most common being attorneys' contingent
fees.72 Indeed, all states now recognize the validity of these contingent
fee agreements. 73 "The open court door policy has had a preeminent
place in the United States, and the contingency legal fee has been
viewed as the poor and middle income person's ticket to justice."7 4
Currently, states treat champertous agreements differently.75 In
New Jersey, Massachusetts, and Arizona, for example, champerty is not
prohibited, and courts regularly enforce such agreements.76 Complete
approval of champerty, however, appears to be an exception to the rule,
as most states continue to prohibit champerty in some way, either by
66. Martin, supra note 1, at 87.
67. Kraft v. Mason, 668 So. 2d 679, 682 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1996).
68. Id. (internal citation and quotations omitted; ellipses in original).
69. See 14 C.J.S. Champerty and Maintenance; Barratry and Related Matters § 1 (2006)
("The prohibition against champerty is designed to cure malicious 'stirring up' of litigation that
would not otherwise have occurred. The activity of champerty is repugnant to public policy
against profiteering and speculating in litigation and is grounds for denying the aid of the court.")
(footnote omitted).
70. Kraft, 668 So. 2d at 682 ("Though Appellants argue to this court that we should follow
the strict common-law definitions, the few cases in Florida on this subject support the more
modern-day approach that officious intermeddling is a necessary element of champerty.")
71. See Martin, supra note 1, at 87.
72. Id.
73. Id. See also Kenneth A. Ewing, Comment, Quantum Meruit in Ohio: The Search for a
Fair Standard in Contingent Fee Contracts, 18 U. DAYTON L. REV. 109, 110 (1992).
74. See Martin, supra note 1, at 87 (internal quotations omitted).
75. Id. at 87-88.
76. Id.
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statute or common law.77
Florida falls within the latter category.78 Florida, however, rejects
the strict common law champerty formulation,79 adopting instead a more
"modern-day approach," requiring "officious intermeddling" as a neces-
sary element of the practice.80 Florida's Fourth District Court of Appeal
defines officious intermeddling as "offering unnecessary and unwanted
advice or services; meddlesome, [especially] in a highhanded or over-
bearing way."'" This additional element significantly limits the doc-
trine's reach and makes applying champerty to litigation financing
agreements more difficult.82
For example, some commentators have noted that "litigation sup-
port firms... are clearly engaging in champerty" because they are "pro-
viding funds in exchange for a share of a settlement or verdict."83 This
argument presupposes a stricter formulation of champerty. Florida's
additional requirement of officious intermeddling to establish champerty
requires more intentional conduct on the part of the champertor.84
Accordingly, despite the commentary, no Florida court has refused to
enforce a litigation financing agreement because of champerty8
B. Usury
Usury generally is defined as "the act or practice of lending money
at a rate of interest that is excessive or unlawfully high."86 The doc-
trine's history in the United States dates back to colonial times, when the
colonists enacted usury laws to "protect consumers from the overreach-
ing acts of creditors. ' 87 During the mid to late nineteenth century, at the
urging of economists who argued that the laws inhibited economic
growth and undermined efficiency, many states repealed their usury
laws.88 But, "[b]y the early twentieth century most states again had
usury laws that limited interest rates to between six and twelve per-
cent. 89 Most states have retained their usury statues. 90
77. Id. at 88.
78. See Kraft v. Mason, 668 So. 2d 679, 682 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1996).
79. Id.
80. Id.
81. Id. (internal quotations and citation omitted).
82. See, e.g., id. at 681-83.
83. See Martin, supra note 1, at 88.
84. See Kraft v. Mason, 668 So. 2d 679, 682 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1996).
85. Id. at 88-89.
86. WEBSTER'S NEW TWENTIETH CENTURY DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE
UNABRIDGED 2013 (2d ed. 1980).
87. See Martin, supra note 1, at 89.
88. Id. at 89-90.
89. Id. at 90.
90. Id.
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In Florida, as in most other states, the elements necessary to estab-
lish usury are: (1) a loan, express or implied; (2) an understanding
between the parties that the money loaned must be repaid; (3) in consid-
eration of the loan, the borrower pays or agrees to pay a greater interest
rate than is allowed by law; and (4) a corrupt intent to take more than the
legal rate for the use of the money loaned.9 Florida Statute 687.01
defines a "usurious contract" as one setting an interest rate above eigh-
teen-percent.92
Elements two and four are particularly relevant when discussing
litigation financing. First, Florida courts have held that the contingent
nature of settlement or a favorable verdict makes a financing agreement
non-usurious.9 3 For example, in Kraft v. Mason, within the context of
an antitrust litigation financing agreement, the court rejected a bor-
rower's usury claim that sought to avoid paying the agreed-upon loan
interest.94 The court explained that the interest could be characterized as
a "bonus ... for participating in an uncertain transaction. A loan agree-
ment is not usurious when payment depends upon a contingency." 95 In
Kraft, at the time the loan was given, talk of possible recovery was mere
speculation.96 Indeed, "[q]uite possibly, there would be no successful
recovery" by the plaintiff, in which case the lender would only receive
the initial amount lent.97 "This contingent nature of any 'interest'
makes the agreement non-usurious." 98
In addition to the repayment's contingent nature, Florida courts
have also focused on the lender's intent in deciding whether usury's
fourth element has been met.99 Adopting a definition requiring willful-
ness and knowledge, Florida courts have explained that "[a] thing is
willfully done when it proceeds from a conscious motion of the will
intending the result which actually comes to pass. It must be designed
or intentional, and may be malicious, though not necessarily so."" In
explaining the requisite level of intent upon which to base a usury find-
ing, the Kraft court juxtaposed the facts before it with those in Jersey
91. Kraft v. Mason, 668 So. 2d 679, 683 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1996).
92. Id. (Section 687.01, Florida Statutes (2006), refers to the interest rate set pursuant to
Section 55.03, Florida Statutes (2006), which is currently approximately eighteen-percent).
93. Kraft, 668 So. 2d at 684.
94. Id. at 681, 684.
95. Id. at 684.
96. Id.
97. Id.
98. Id.
99. Id. at 683 ("The main issue before this court is whether the trial court erred in determining
that no corrupt intent existed to collect interest at a usurious rate.")
100. Id. at 684 (internal citation omitted).
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Palm-Gross, Inc. v. Paper.'0
The lender in Jersey was a developer with 40 years of experience.
He was aware of the borrowers' urgent need for the money and the need
to dictate the loan's terms. Based on the usury statute's purpose - to
"bind the power of creditors over necessitous debtors and prevent them
from extorting harsh and undue terms in making loans" - the Jersey
court concluded that the loan was usurious. 02 In affirming the court's
opinion on appeal, the Florida Supreme Court added:
[U]sury is largely a matter of intent, and is not fully determined by
the fact that the lender actually receives more than the law permits,
but is determined by the existence of a corrupt purpose in the
lender's mind to get more than legal interest for the money lent.
Moreover, the question of intent is to be gathered from the circum-
stances surrounding the entire transaction. Consequently, the ulti-
mate arbiter on the issue of intent is the trial court because the
question of intent is one of fact."0 3
In contrast to Jersey, the lender in Kraft was unsophisticated: she
neither knew at the outset the total amount she would recover nor did
she dictate the loan's terms. Indeed, the loan was to be paid following
the litigation. As such, "no one could have known at the loan's incep-
tion the total amount [the lender] would be receiving in consideration for
making the loan.... This is not a case of an overreaching lender taking
advantage of a desperate borrower to impose undue or harsh terms."'"
Based on Florida's current usury jurisprudence, Florida courts
would not likely invalidate a litigation financing agreement as usurious.
Even if a court is disposed to inferring intent based on the lender's level
of sophistication, that factor alone appears insufficient to establish
usury's intent element. As Dixon v. Sharp °5 establishes, the court must
not only consider a lender's sophistication, but also the borrower's
sophistication and situation. Per Dixon, "[f]or the defense of usury to be
established, the circumstances surrounding the entire agreement must be
proved, and they must be carefully scrutinized by the court,"'0 6 which,
according to Justice Ervin's dissent, might include a sophistication
inquiry. 0 7
101. Id. at 683-84 (citing Jersey Palm-Gross, Inc. v. Paper, 639 So. 2d 664 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct.
App. 1994)).
102. Kraft, 668 So. 2d at 684.
103. Id. (emphasis in original; internal quotations omitted).
104. Id. (emphasis in original).
105. 276 So. 2d 817 (Fla. 1973).
106. Id. at 820-21.
107. Id. at 822-23 (Ervin, J., dissenting) ("In determining whether the Dixons knew that they
were charging and receiving excessive interest, the trial court should have borne in mind that the
lenders here were entirely unlike the unsophisticated woodsman who unwittingly lent money to a
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In the typical litigation financing arrangement, one can usually
characterize the litigation financing company as a sophisticated
lender." 8 While this may be true, the question of how desperate a bor-
rower must be to establish usury's intent element remains. Does desper-
ation require a borrower to exhaust all possible funding sources and be a
step away from homelessness? Or does desperation require something
less, some genuine need for money in order to live comfortably? Should
courts base a desperation finding on a plaintiff's socioeconomic status,
finding desperation more readily where a plaintiff's alleged desperation
requires them to give up certain luxury items? The courts must offer
further elucidation of what sort of borrower desperation suffices regard-
ing a usury analysis.
Yet even if a court is willing to find the requisite intent, a plaintiff
will nevertheless encounter difficulty proving usury's second element -
an understanding between the parties that the money loaned must be
repaid.' '9 Litigation financing agreements are premised on a contin-
gency; the initial amount lent plus the accrued interest is only recover-
able if a plaintiff receives a settlement or a favorable jury verdict." 10
The possibility remains, however, that a court would be willing to infer
or presume that certain agreements may, in fact, not be so contingent
and speculative. The Restatement of Contracts supports this argument,
providing that:
Usury laws do not forbid the taking of business chances in the
employment of money.... If the probability of the occurrence of the
contingency on which diminished payment is promised is remote, or
if the diminution should the contingency occur is slight as compared
with the possible profit to be obtained if the contingency does not
occur, the transaction is presumably usurious."'
While not explicitly relying on the Restatement's view, an Ohio
court reached a similar conclusion in Rancman v. Interim Settlement
banker at an excessive rate of interest, as was the case in Chandler v. Kendrick, 108 Fla. 450, 146
So. 551 (Fla.1933), upon which the majority chooses to rely for conflict purposes. We are dealing
with two successful business people. The facts reveal that they knowingly put themselves
squarely in a position clearly violative of our usury laws.").
108. While not regulated like other lenders, one can infer litigation financing companies'
sophistication levels from their practices, such as the amount of money they lend and their
application review process.
109. Dixon, 276 So. 2d at 819.
110. Litigation financing companies are "quite confident that the contingent nature of their
agreements kept them from violating usury laws." See Martin, supra note 1, at 95. See also
ALFA FAQs, supra note 38 ("[T]hese advances do not require repayment of the investment or
any fees if the plaintiff does not receive a financial award or settlement when the case is resolved.
If the case is lost or the defendant insolvent, ALFA Members forfeit their entire investment in that
case.").
111. RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF CONTRACTS § 527 cmt. a (1932).
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Funding Corp.1 2 In Rancman, the plaintiff ("Rancman") was injured in
an automobile accident involving an uninsured driver.1 3 While the liti-
gation was pending, Rancman entered into two litigation financing
agreements. Under these agreements, Rancman was to receive $6,000
from Future Settlement Funding Corporation ("FSF") and $1,000 from
Interim Settlement Funding Corporation ("ISF). "'14 The FSF agreement
required that Rancman pay $16,800 out of the litigation proceeds if the
case settled in twelve months, $22,200 if the case settled in eighteen
months, or $27,600 if it settled in twenty-four months." 5 Under the ISF
agreement, Rancman agreed to pay $2,800 contingent upon receiving a
settlement or favorable jury verdict.1 16  Under both agreements,
Rancman was not obligated to pay anything if she did not recover in the
litigation. 1 7 Rancman entered into the agreements against her attor-
ney's advice and testified that she was aware of and understood the
agreements' terms.' '8
Rancman filed a claim against State Farm Insurance under the unin-
sured motorist provision of her husband's insurance policy. " 9 While a
question existed whether Rancman was covered at the time of the acci-
dent due to her separation from her husband, State Farm nevertheless
made a $35,000 settlement offer. 120 Rancman rejected the settlement
offer and subsequently entered into the agreement with ISF.' 2'
Rancman ultimately settled the claim with State Farm for $100,000,
after which she brought suit against FSF and ISF "seeking, inter alia, a
declaratory judgment that the loan agreements were void because they
were usurious."'
12 2
At the usury trial, the magistrate stated that the contracts violated
the usury interest law and the Small Loan Act, and as such, FSF and ISF
either should not receive anything, or alternatively, should receive the
principal plus eight-percent annual interest. 123 The trial court, adopting
the magistrate's conclusion, elected the latter remedy, and both sides
appealed. 24
112. No. 20523, 2001 WL 1339487 (Ohio Ct. App. 9th Dist. Oct. 31, 2001).
113. Id. at *1.
114. Id.
115. Martin, supra note 1, at 91.
116. Id.
117. Rancman, 2001 WL 1339487, at *2.
118. Id. at *3.
119. Id.
120. Id.
121. Id. at *1, *3. It is unclear whether State Farm's initial offer was made prior to Rancman's
agreement with FSF as the issue was not pursued by the court.
122. Id. at *1 (emphasis in original).
123. Rancman, 2001 WL 1339487, at *1.
124. Id. at *3.
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The Ohio Court of Appeals rejected FSF and ISF's argument that
the transactions were contingent cash advances; rather, the court held
that the transactions were loans.' 25 The court defined a loan as
[a] contract by which one delivers a sum of money to another and the
latter agrees to return at a future time a sum equivalent to that which
he borrows. . . The payment of a sum is considered 'repayable
absolutely' if non-payment of the amount is 'so improbable as to con-
vince the court or jury that there was no real hazard.' 126
In classifying the agreements as loans, the court relied heavily on
the testimony of the ISF president. Specifically, the president testified
that he had been trained on how to evaluate a personal injury case's
risks. At trial, he testified to utilizing numerous factors to determine
whether the case presented a low risk of non-recovery. He found many
of these factors in Rancman's case, including: (1) a skilled attorney; (2)
full access to the case file; (3) lack of liability on Rancman's part for the
accident; (4) a vehicle that received a serious impact in the accident; (5)
"bright blood" injuries; (6) medical bills; and (7) estimable value based
on injuries comparable to Rancman's found in a jury verdict database.127
Based on this evidence, the court determined that the agreements were
loans, as "no real probability existed that non-payment would occur." 128
Accordingly, the court reversed the trial court's order that Rancman
repay the principal with interest on both of the agreements. 129
Rancman represents the "first case where a litigation financing
company has been found guilty of violating a statute in connection with
making a loan."' 130 In considering the response to Rancman, or lack
thereof, it may also represent the only case where a litigation financing
company has been found to have violated a statute in connection with
making a loan.
In Florida, for example, Florida's Office of Financial Regulation
issued an informal opinion in 2002 deeming litigation financing a loan,
125. Id.
126. Id.
127. Id. at *2-3.
128. Id. at *3. The court never reached the parties' assignment of error regarding usury.
Because the court already classified the transactions as loans, the assignment of error as to usury
was rendered moot.
129. The court's reversal was based on its finding that both loans violated Ohio Revised Code
Section 1321.02, which provides that "any contract of loan in the making or collection of which
an act is done by the lender that violates this section is void and the lender has no right to collect,
receive, or retain any principal, interest or charges." Because ISF's president contracted for small
loans on behalf of ISF and FSF without a license, Section 1321.02 barred recovery. See Rancman
v. Interim Settlement Funding Corp., No. 20523, 2001 WL 1339487, at *3 (Ohio Ct. App. 9th
Dist. Oct. 31, 2001).
130. See Martin, supra note 1, at 94 (internal quotations omitted).
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and thereby subject to state usury laws. 3 ' The opinion stated, "[i]t is
the substance and not the form that determines whether a transaction is
usurious. '"132 While state law caps loan interest rates at eighteen-per-
cent, litigation financing company fees may reach one-hundred-and-
eighty-percent of the principal on an annualized basis.133 If the legisla-
ture and courts classified litigation financing companies' fund advances
as standard loans, such financing charges would undoubtedly violate
Florida's anti-usury statute and subject the companies to civil penalties
and criminal prosecution.1 34 The opinion went on to urge the financing
companies who disagreed with the opinion to petition the legislature to
change the law. 135
Despite this invitation, the reaction to the opinion was generally
insignificant. The most noteworthy response came from Thomas Crapps
of the Douglas Law Firm in Tallahassee, who wrote a response on
behalf of Advance Settlement Funding and its president Al J. Cone.
136
In his letter, Crapps maintained that the "litigant's selling of a portion of
his or her contingent settlement proceeds is an assignment, not a
loan."' 37 Crapps premised his position on the fact that the transactions
have no monthly payments, promissory notes, collateral, interest rates,
maturity dates, or default provision. 38 Because of these differences,
Crapps argued, state anti-usury laws should not apply. 139 Crapps con-
cluded that "[c]learly, the litigant's selling of a portion of his or her
contingent settlement is an assignment, not a loan."' 4
In retrospect, financing companies operating in Florida had no rea-
son for concern. Since the opinion's release, Florida has done nothing to
indicate enforcement efforts are forthcoming.14 1 Robert Beitler, General
Counsel in the Office of Financial Regulation, believes that Florida will
not enforce the informal opinion unless consumers file complaints.'42
131. See Doris, supra note 26, at 3.
132. Id.
133. Id.
134. Id.
135. Id.
136. Id.
137. Id.
138. Id.
139. Id.
140. Id. Advance Settlement Funding president Al J. Cone added that the "risk of essentially
betting on the outcome of a lawsuit justifies a financing charge that far exceeds standard interest
rates on loans, which generally are collateralized." Id.
141. Id. at 1, 4.
142. Id.
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C. Unconscionability
Unconscionability is defined as the "absence of meaningful choice
.. together with contract terms which are unreasonably favorable to the
other party." 14 3 Unconscionability has two requirements: (1) procedural
unconscionability; and (2) substantive unconscionability.144
Procedural unconscionability involves an "absence of meaningful
choice, [and] is determined by analyzing the respective bargaining pow-
ers of the contracting parties, and the ability of the particular contracting
party, in light of his education, intelligence, or lack thereof, to under-
stand the terms of the contract."' 45  Other relevant considerations
include "who drafted the contract, whether the terms were explained to
the weaker party, whether alterations in the printed terms were possi-
ble," and "whether there were alternative sources of supply for the goods
in question."' 146  Substantive unconscionability, on the other hand,
"embraces the contractual terms themselves, and requires a determina-
tion whether they are commercially reasonable."'' 47
Typically, courts employ a balancing test to decide whether a con-
tract is unconscionable.' 48 While "the prevailing view is that [procedu-
ral and substantive unconscionability] must both be present in order for
a court to exercise its discretion to refuse to enforce a contract or clause
under the doctrine of unconscionability," both need not be present to the
same degree. 4 9 "Essentially a sliding scale is invoked which disregards
the regularity of the procedural process of the contract formation, that
creates the terms, in proportion to the greater harshness or unreasonable-
ness of the substantive terms themselves."' 5 ° Thus, the more evidence
of substantive unconscionability that is presented, the less evidence of
procedural unconscionability the plaintiff must present for the court to
find a contract unenforceable, and vice versa.' 5 '
Based on this balancing test, it is possible that a Florida court might
find a litigation financing agreement unconscionable. While there is no
opinion invalidating such an agreement on the grounds of unconsciona-
bility, the plaintiff did advance an unconscionability argument in trial
143. Williams v. Walker-Thomas Furniture Co., 350 F.2d 445, 449 (D.C. Cir. 1965).
144. Kohl v. Bay Colony Club Condo., Inc., 398 So. 2d 865, 867 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App.
1981).
145. Bennett v. Behring Corp., 466 F. Supp. 689, 696 (S.D. Fla. 1979) (relying on Williams,
350 F.2d 445).
146. Kohl, 398 So. 2d at 868.
147. Id.
148. Romano v. Manor Care, Inc., 861 So. 2d 59, 62 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 2003).
149. Id. (quoting Stirlen v. Supercuts, Inc., 51 Cal. App. 4th 1519, 1533, 60 Cal. Rptr. 2d 138,
145 (Cal. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1997)) (internal quotations omitted).
150. Romano, 861 So. 2d at 62 (internal quotations omitted).
151. Id.
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court in Fausone v. U.S. Claims, Inc.'5 2 Florida's Second District Court
of Appeal, however, did not reach the question of unconscionability
because of the plaintiff's procedural decisions. 153
IV. FAUSONE V. U.S. CLAIMS, INC.
A. Factual Background
In Fausone v. U.S. Claims, Inc., the plaintiff, Fausone, was injured
in May 2000 when she was struck by a dump truck while riding her
bicycle.154 She retained Florin, Roebig & Walker, P.A., to represent her
in the resulting personal injury claim and in a second products liability
action unrelated to the bicycle accident.' 55
Five months later, in October 2000, Fausone began selling interests
in her lawsuits to various litigation financing companies.'56 Ultimately,
she entered into financing agreements with three companies: Advance
Settlement Funding, Inc. of Silver Springs, Florida, Advance Legal
Funding, LLC of Biloxi, Mississippi, and U.S. Claims. 57 Under the
financing agreement with Advance Legal Funding, LLC, Fausone
received $3,000 in October 2000.58 The contract provided that if she
were to settle her lawsuit before May 1, 2001, she would owe $6,000 to
the company.159 If settlement occurred subsequent to this date, she
would repay $9,000 plus eighteen-percent interest.160  As the court
noted, "the interest rate on this transaction depended on the date of
repayment, but was never less than 200%. " 161
Fausone also received $2,000 from Advance Settlement Funding,
Inc. 16 2 In the contract, Fausone agreed to a repayment schedule that
would increase $150 each month, with the total not to exceed $4,250.163
The court estimated that the annual rate of interest under this agreement
was approximately ninety-percent for the first year. 164
152. 915 So. 2d 626 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 2005).
153. Id. at 629-30.
154. Id. at 627.
155. Id
156. Id.
157. Id.
158. Id.
159. Id. at 627.
160. Id.
161. Id.
162. Id.
163. Id.
164. Id. Ms. Fausone apparently entered into additional litigation financing agreements with
Advance Settlement Funding, as her account debt was $8,075 in August 2001 and was increasing
by $375 per month. These facts reflect a finding in the arbitration decision between Fausone and
U.S. Claims.
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In 2001, Fausone contacted U.S. Claims for additional financing. 165
The company initially advanced Fausone $18,000, some of which was
used to consolidate her previous loans. 166 Between August 2001 and
November 2002, Fausone returned to U.S. Claims on numerous occa-
sions to obtain more financing. 67 By November 2002, Ms. Fausone had
secured approximately $30,000 from U.S. Claims. 68
B. The Financing Agreement
It is unclear how Fausone learned of U.S. Claims and whether she
initially contacted the company. 169 That question aside, the agreements
stated that if the claim's proceeds were less than the money owed, U.S.
Claims would be entitled to one-hundred-percent of the proceeds. 170
Alternatively, if no money was received, Fausone was not obligated to
make any payment unless failure of recovery was due to "fraud, misrep-
resentation, breach of warranty or failure to perform any covenant" by
Fausone or her attorney. 71 Fausone was also prohibited from selling
any part of the proceeds of her claim to any other funding source.17 2
Fausone's attorneys allegedly reviewed and forwarded the agreements to
U.S. Claims. 7 3 Moreover, the attorneys furnished information concern-
ing Fausone's claim to assist the financing company in determining
whether to advance Fausone funds. 174
The repayment schedule to which Fausone agreed was based on the
$30,000 total amount advanced. 75 Under the agreement, Fausone was
required to repay $42,890 before November 14, 2002; $46,808 after
November 14, 2002, but before February 14, 2003; and, $50,937 after
February 14, 2003, but before May 14, 2003.176 While the terms U.S.
Claims offered were more satisfactory than Fausone's other agreements,
the interest rate for the loans was "still well above the rates normally
allowed for consumer transactions."' 177
Finally, the agreement contained miscellaneous provisions gov-
erning choice of law, venue, and the method of resolution of disputes
165. Id.
166. Id. at 628.
167. Id.
168. Id.
169. Id.
170. Id.
171. Id. at 627.
172. Id.
173. Id.
174. Id.
175. Id.
176. Id.
177. Id.
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growing out of the agreement. 178 Specifically, U.S. Claims retained the
"unilateral right to obtain equitable relief in either Pennsylvania or Dela-
ware" in the event of disagreements between the parties.' 79 Fausone
waived her right to challenge personal jurisdiction or venue in those
states. 180 Furthermore, the agreement was governed and construed pur-
suant to Delaware law, with the exception of Delaware rules regarding
conflicts of law.' 8 ' As such, Fausone could not argue that Delaware
should apply Florida law in a dispute occurring under the U.S. Claims
contract.' 82 Finally, aside from U.S. Claims' unilateral right to obtain
equitable relief, the agreement provided for arbitration in either Penn-
sylvania or Delaware as the exclusive method for dispute resolution.
183
C. Arbitration
In 2003, Fausone settled her personal injury claim for the bicycle
accident for an amount in excess of $200,000.184 However, in a letter to
U.S. Claims, Fausone's attorney said that she had instructed him not to
remit repayment to U.S. Claims.' 85 Under the repayment schedule,
Fausone owed U.S. Claims a total of $50,937 at this time.186 To compel
Fausone to repay the debt, U.S. Claims initiated arbitration with the
American Arbitration Association in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania.
187
However, soon after this action, Fausone filed a petition for declaratory
judgment in Pasco County, Florida, alleging that the U.S. Claims litiga-
tion financing agreement was unconscionable, usurious, and unfair in
the sense that she should not be forced to arbitrate.
88
In response, U.S. Claims filed a motion to dismiss or abate the
Florida claim pending arbitration. 8 9 Ultimately, the Pasco County trial
court stayed the claim pending arbitration, which occurred in February
2004 in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania. Despite having the opportunity to
participate in the arbitration via telephone, Fausone chose not to attend.
As a result of the arbitration, U.S. Claims was awarded $72,117.190
178. Id.
179. Id.
180. Id.
181. Id.
182. Id.
183. Id.
184. Id. at 629.
185. Id.
186. Id.
187. Id.
188. Id.
189. Id.
190. Id. The court explained that, pursuant to the repayment schedule, $72,117 was the amount
Fausone would have to repay if her payment was made after February 14, 2004, and before May
14, 2004. Id. Further, while this was the amount awarded as a result of the arbitration, the
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Fausone filed a motion in Pasco County, Florida to vacate the arbi-
tration award. 9 ' Subsequently, U.S. Claims filed a motion to confirm
the award. 9 2 After an April 2004 hearing on the motions, Fausone
decided not to proceed with her motion to vacate the award. 193 Thereaf-
ter, the Pasco County trial court granted U.S. Claims' motion to confirm
the arbitration award. 194
D. Appeal Before Florida's Second District Court of Appeal
Relying on Florida Statute 682.121,191 the court explained that
because Fausone withdrew her motion to vacate the arbitration award,
"there are few, if any, preserved issues for appeal."' 9 6 The court stated
that, "[Fausone] has not demonstrated that the purchase agreements
could be invalidated by a Florida court."' 97
More significantly, however, the court noted that, "there appear to
be no laws regulating such agreements in Florida. They are not treated
like consumer loans."1 98 As a result, the court affirmed the trial court
judgment and granted U.S. Claims' motion for attorneys' fees pursuant
to the agreement.' 99
E. A Possible Need for Regulation
In affirming the judgment and granting U.S. Claims' motion for
attorneys' fees, the court commented on a possible need for regulation of
financing agreements such as the one at issue in this case.2°° The court,
as aforementioned, observed that "[t]here appear to be no laws regulat-
ing such agreements in Florida. They are not treated like consumer
loans."'20 ' Citing a 2002 Florida Bar Ethics Opinion, the court acknowl-
edged that the practice of financing litigation was not restricted.2 °2
While an attorney may not issue a letter of protection to the funding
arbitration order also provided that failure to remit payment by May 14, 2004, would increase the
amount owed according to the agreement's payment schedule. Id. "It is unclear from the record
whether this amount has continued to increase during the term of the arbitration and litigation."
Id.
191. Id.
192. Id.
193. Id.
194. Id.
195. Id. (relying on § 682.12, FLA. STAT. (2004)) ("[A] court shall confirm an arbitration
award unless a motion to vacate or modify the award is pending.").
196. Id.
197. Id.
198. Id.
199. Id.
200. Id. at 630.
201. Id.
202. Id.
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company, she does not violate ethical norms by providing information
about litigation companies to her client, furnishing information about her
client's case to such companies (assuming the client consents), or honor-
ing the written assignment of the client's claim.0 3
At the outset, the court recognized the need for plaintiffs such as
Fausone to obtain a credit source during litigation:
A person who suffers a severe personal injury will often need money
to care for herself and her family during the pendency of litigation.
Lawsuits take time and come with few guarantees. Grocery stores
and home mortgage lenders do not wait for payment merely because
a person is unable to work due to an automobile accident or other
injury.204
At the same time, however, an accident victim should not be "fur-
ther victimized by loan companies charging interest rates that are higher
than the risks associated with the transaction. 20 5 While the record on
appeal did not indicate the value of Fausone's claim at the time she
sought financing with U.S. Claims, the court reasoned that a company
that only extended financing to plaintiffs with "high-grade personal
injury claims" would seem to be able to offer a lower interest rate on the
advance than those at issue in this case.20 6
Additionally, the court characterized the agreement's venue and
dispute resolution terms as "one-sided and designed to prevent a Florida
citizen from having access to a local court or another local dispute reso-
lution forum. '2 7 Finally, the agreements created ambiguity as to which
party truly owned and controlled the lawsuit, an issue posing a risk that
the attorney-client privilege was unintentionally waived.20 8
Despite these criticisms, however, the court concluded that it
lacked the authority to regulate litigation financing agreements.20 9
Instead, the court called on the Florida Legislature to "examine this
industry to determine whether Florida's citizens are in need of any statu-
tory protection. 210
V. CRITICISM OF THE LITIGATION FINANCING INDUSTRY
The Florida Second District Court of Appeal's criticism of the liti-
gation financing industry mirrors criticisms levied by legislators, com-
203. Id. at 629-30.
204. Id. at 630.
205. Id.
206. Id.
207. Id.
208. Id.
209. Id.
210. Id.
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mentators, and consumer protection groups. In contrast to the
previously discussed arguments regarding usury and champerty, these
arguments are based not on statute or common law, but rather on policy
and ethical considerations. Essentially, the arguments against litigation
financing arrangements tend to parallel arguments against attorneys'
contingent fees.21 ' These criticisms are discussed in turn below.
Primarily, critics argue that litigation financing companies
encourage meritless litigation and frivolous lawsuits.2 12 By extending
funding to plaintiffs, litigation financing companies may resuscitate
weak or uncertain suits that otherwise would not have been filed. The
industry, organized as the American Legal Finance Association
("ALFA"), has vehemently rejected this allegation, maintaining that it
"does not promote frivolous litigation [but] actually discourages it. ' 213
First, ALFA explains that ALFA members only come into the picture
after a claim has been filed, typically a few months into litigation.21 4
Moreover, the industry maintains that its procedure of reviewing poten-
tial cases to determine whether to extend funding ensures that if a com-
pany encounters a frivolous suit, they will not fund the case:
215
Besides being against public policy, frivolous cases also make very
bad investments, since the overwhelming majority of them have low
probability of success. By helping victims with compelling claims,
ALFA members actually discourage frivolous litigation by denying
frivolous cases financial support. By facilitating a more direct, trans-
parent and rational distribution of capital to plaintiffs, we enable a
more balanced and efficient legal system, which is consistent with the
realities and demands of a modem free market economy.
2
16
As one commentator has noted, "funding companies have no incentive
to advance money to plaintiffs whose lawsuits might reasonably be
described as frivolous because the companies' chance of recovery is
low. Litigation funding companies exist to make money, not to throw it
211. See Martin, supra note 1, at 95 ("Those critics argue that a contingent fee is justified only
when there is a real contingency, that is, where there is an actual risk of no recovery. They
complain that lawyers enter into contingency fee arrangements without considering the likelihood
of recovery, even in situations where non-recovery is not a possibility." (footnotes omitted)).
212. See Doris, supra note 26, at 4. In 2002, Associated Industries of Florida, a Tallahassee-
based business lobbying group, announced that it would seek legislation to prevent "outside
entities from financing litigation." Id. (internal quotations omitted). The group's website deemed
financing companies "rogue credit operations [that] can only further fuel unnecessary and reckless
litigation and magnify plaintiff attorneys' ability to inhibit commerce." Id. (internal quotations
omitted). In a follow-up interview, however, Associated Industries president John Shebel noted
that the group's legislative attack on litigation financing did not materialize. Id.
213. See ALFA FAQs, supra note 38.
214. Id.
215. Id.
216. Id.
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away."'2 17
Due to the financing company's stake in the case's outcome, how-
ever, it has also been argued that the company's presence prolongs liti-
gation and prevents or discourages settlement.2 I A plaintiff
understands that she must pay various groups and individuals - includ-
ing her attorney - once the case settles or is otherwise resolved. If the
plaintiff borrowed money under a litigation financing agreement, she
must also pay the financing company the principal amount advanced, as
well as the financing fee. Both the attorney and the financing company
are paid out of the settlement or verdict's proceeds. Depending on the
amounts due to the attorney and the financing company, a plaintiff may
be hesitant to settle the case, instead holding out for a greater sum.
Financing companies and commentators claim this fear is
unfounded.
The law favors fair and just settlements, not unfair or unjust settle-
ments brought about by a party's economic desperation or financial
inability to litigate meritorious claims. Both the public and the jus-
tice system benefit when litigants with legitimate disputes face one
another on a level playing field. Litigation funding may even pro-
mote settlement and discourage prolonged litigation by forcing a
recalcitrant defendant to approach a case reasonably and pragmati-
cally in light of the fact that its adversary has the resources to mean-
ingfully prosecute the matter.219
A related concern centers on the parties' roles and relationship -
namely the plaintiff, her attorney, and the litigation financing company -
and the extent to which each exercises control and ownership over the
claim and its future. Professor Anthony V. Alfieri, Director of the
Center for Ethics and Public Service at the University of Miami,
expressed concern that "[t]he presence of third-party financing may pal-
pably or subtly influence litigation strategy in ways that may be inimical
to the best interest of a client. ' 220 Depending on the financing com-
pany's degree of involvement, questions may arise as to which party
actually owns the lawsuit. Moreover, the financing company's presence
- a third-party - may result in an unintentional waiver of attorney-client
privilege, as the company is in no way associated with the attorney nor
may correctly be classified as the attorney's representative or agent.
Neither the financing companies nor commentators have responded
217. Douglas R. Richmond, Other People's Money: The Ethics of Litigation Funding, 56
MERCER L. REV. 649, 660-61 (2005) (footnotes omitted).
218. Id.
219. Id.
220. Swan, supra note 22, at 831 (citing Adam Miller, Rolling the Dice, MIAMI DAILY Bus.
REV., Vol. 75, No. 24 (July 14, 2000), at All).
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directly to these arguments, only reaffirming that the companies' pri-
mary and sole role is advancing the plaintiff litigation funds.
These criticisms and the counterarguments they have elicited, how-
ever, are inherently misguided. Specifically, both the pro and con argu-
ments are forward-looking and selectively ends-driven. For example,
the arguments on both sides assess the issue from a pre-resolution per-
spective. Such an assessment, particularly from the financing company,
is dangerous - while justifying their validity based on the fact that the
plaintiff was able to bring a meritorious suit, the companies overlook the
plight of the plaintiff post-settlement, when payment is due. Indeed,
while the plaintiff may have obtained a favorable outcome regarding the
lawsuit, her battle may be far from over, depending on the amount of
money she owes her attorney and the financing company, and the total
amount awarded as a result of the lawsuit.
Additionally, the validity and ethics of litigation financing agree-
ments are justified primarily in terms of a selected end: the plaintiff's
ability to bring the suit. Subscribing to an elementary "ends justify the
means" analysis, financing companies and their proponents argue that it
is the attainment of this end that justifies the means, regardless of how
burdensome, unfair, and one-sided the ends may be. Yet simplifying the
arrangement in such a way overlooks just how burdensome, unfair, and
one-sided the means may be. As discussed previously, a litigation
financing company may easily triple its investment.2 One commenta-
tor noted that:
[C]ourts just do not like it. There is something unseemly about
investors making money by betting on the outcome of litigation;
investors making a lot of money for risk that sometimes may be lim-
ited; and investors making money in circumstances involving people
who do not have any. All these factors make litigation financing
seem like just another example of predatory lending.222
A March 2002 Florida Bar Opinion reflected these concerns. The
opinion made no comment regarding litigation financing agreements'
legality, but stated that "[i]f the transactions are illegal, an attorney must
not participate in the transaction in any way. 223 Furthermore, it dis-
couraged using these financing companies, as the "terms of the funding
agreements offered to clients may not serve the client's best interests in
many instances. 224 Consistent with its concern, the Committee placed
221. Mike France, The Litigation Machine, Bus. WEEK ONLINE, Jan. 29, 2001, http://www.
businessweek.com/2001/01_05/b3717001.htm.
222. Susan Lorde Martin, The Litigation Financing Industry: The Wild West of Finance Should
Be Tamed Not Outlawed, 10 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 55, 63 (2004).
223. Fla. Bar Op. 00-3 (March 15, 2002), 2002 WL 463991, at *1.
224. Id. at *4.
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restrictions and duties on attorneys in advising their clients regarding a
litigation financing transaction and participating in or assisting the client
with the transaction.225 Specifically, the Committee prohibited attorneys
from signing letters of protection to the company on behalf of their cli-
ents and urged attorneys to fully discuss the risks and benefits of these
arrangements with clients prior to entering such an agreement. 6
VI. PROPOSED SOLUTIONS
Recent commentary in the litigation financing debate frames the
matter as an "all-or-nothing" issue: either ban the practice completely,
thereby depriving needy plaintiffs of the ability to bring potentially mer-
itorious claims, or allow the practice to continue, free from regulation, in
turn allowing the financing companies to continue to benefit at the plain-
tiff's expense. This classification of the issue as a zero-sum game over-
looks the possibility of an effective and mutually-agreeable middle
ground: regulation without total prohibition. Three regulatory proposals
are presented below.
A. State Regulation
Neither the states nor the federal government currently regulates
litigation financing companies in any coherent or direct manner. Conse-
quently, the companies are able to charge financing fees, which, if regu-
lated as traditional loans, would undoubtedly violate state anti-usury
laws and other borrower-protective laws.2 27 However, at present, no
state legislature has proposed or enacted laws regulating financing
companies.
The current situation in Florida is no different. According to the
Fausone court, "the court has no authority to regulate these agree-
ments. ' '2 28 Though the Florida Bar currently allows attorneys to pro-
mote and provide these agreements to clients, the court suggested that
because "a person who is the victim of an accident should not be further
victimized by loan companies charging interest rates that are higher than
the risks associated with the transaction," the Florida Legislature "might
wish to examine this industry to determine whether Florida's citizens are
in need of any statutory protection. '22 9 Despite the Fausone court's
invitation, State Senator Walter Campbell, a plaintiffs' attorney and
member of the Senate Judiciary Committee, stated that he was "not
225. Id.
226. Id.
227. See generally Doris, supra note 26, at 3.
228. See Fausone v. U.S. Claims, Inc., 915 So. 2d 626, 630 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 2005).
229. Id.
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aware of any lawmaker pushing regulating legislation. 23 °
Similarly, there exists no protective or regulatory legislation on the
federal level. In response, one commentator has advocated expanding
the reach of the federal Truth in Lending Act ("TILA") to include litiga-
tion financing companies. She believes this may provide a means of
regulation that is both highly protective of borrowers and reasonably
non-intrusive for the companies. TILA is intended to "strengthen com-
petition among firms extending credit by the informed use of credit and
to enable their customers to compare more easily the credit terms availa-
ble .... "2 Currently, litigation financing companies do not fall within
TILA's regulatory reach due to its relatively narrow "credit" definition.
Under TILA, "'[c]redit' must involve the deferred payment of a 'debt.'
Generally, for a transfer of money to qualify as a 'debt,' the 'repayment
of the purported debt cannot be contingent upon a future event.' "232
Because litigation financing is premised on a contingency, namely the
plaintiff's success in the litigation, it cannot be said that such companies
extend "credit" within the meaning of the TILA.
In her proposal to amend TILA to include litigation financing com-
panies, Professor Susan Lorde Martin suggests expanding the meaning
of "debt" to comprise "contingent obligations when funds are advanced
to support litigation. 233 Professor Martin points to existing precedent
for altering the definition of "debt" based on the context in which it is
used, specifically to define it as including contingent obligations.234
Protection under TILA provides plaintiffs/borrowers conspicuous dis-
closure of finance charges and annual percentage rates calculated in a
uniform way. Any advertising, including Internet advertising, which
is an important method for litigation financing firms appealing to cus-
tomers, would have to set forth clearly and conspicuously the cost of
the funds advanced. Such disclosure would enable plaintiffs/borrow-
ers to understand more easily what their cash advances would actu-
ally cost them if they did receive awards from the litigation, and it
would enable them to shop around for the most favorable offer and to
bargain for fee reductions.235
While Professor Martin pinpoints a major concern and focal point
in protecting plaintiff-borrowers, her proposed solution, her reliance on
230. Carl Jones, Lawsuit Financing Industry Survives Appellate-Level Challenge, MIAMI
DAILY Bus. REV., VOL. 80, No. 71 (Sept. 20, 2005), at 3, available at http://www.westlaw.com
(enter citation "9/20/2005 MIAMIDBR I" under "Quick Research" and select "Go") (page pin
citation is to article version available on Westlaw).
231. See Martin, supra note 222, at 68.
232. Id. at 69 (footnote omitted).
233. Id.
234. Id.
235. Id. at 69-70 (footnotes omitted).
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disclosure, without more, does not go far enough. Specifically, the
majority of states who do not prohibit such agreements impose an ethi-
cal obligation on an attorney to fully discuss the pros and cons of the
agreement with the client prior to the client entering into the agree-
ment.236 It would seem that an attorney who did not feel as if such an
agreement was in a client's best interests or who was not convinced that
the client fully appreciated what she was entering, would voice those
concerns directly to the client. Moreover, according to the ALFA web-
site, the majority of the member organization's financing clients come
from attorneys themselves. 237 As a result, the attorney would presuma-
bly not refer a client to a litigation financing company in the first place if
she had reservations. Due to the attorney's probable presence, any addi-
tional disclosure requirement appears to be superfluous.
B. Laissez-Faire Regulation
In a nod to Adam Smith and the market's "Invisible Hand," litiga-
tion financing companies have responded to calls for regulation by
claiming that the market has proven to be, and will continue to be, a
sufficient regulatory force. Prefacing this argument, financing compa-
nies have reaffirmed that they are not in the business of providing
loans.238 As such, "traditional bank loan interest rates cannot apply to
these funds. 239
Lawsuits are risky investments and "non-recourse" advances are pro-
vided in situations where there is an unknown outcome, an uncertain
maturity date, and the recipient has no current means for repaying the
funds advanced to them. Furthermore, these advances do not require
repayment of the investment or any fees if the plaintiff does not
receive a financial award or settlement when the case is resolved. If
the case is lost or the defendant insolvent, ALFA members forfeit
their entire investment in that case. The higher rates also reflect the
high transaction costs associated with processing, origination and ser-
vicing small advances.2 40
Moreover, ALFA claims that there is a "great misconception about the
rates ALFA Members charge. ' 241 Because of the cases' indeterminable
outcomes, uncertain maturity dates, and current inability to service the
236. See Fla. Bar Op. 00-3 (March 15, 2002), 2002 WL 463991, at *4.
237. ALFA FAQs, supra note 38 ("It is illegal in most states for attorneys representing
personal injury victims in their lawsuits to provide any financial support to their clients. Instead,
these attorneys may refer their clients to an ALFA member company when the client is
experiencing financial distress during the course of his or her case.").
238. Id.
239. Id.
240. Id.
241. Id.
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advance, combined with ALFA member's own internal finding costs
(typically fifteen-percent per annum or greater), annual loss rates, over-
head, wages, benefits, and other general operating costs, litigation
financing companies must charge higher interest rates to stay in
business.242
Accordingly, ALFA maintains that the market has served as an
"efficient regulator of rates over the past five years. 2 43 ALFA explains
that in the past, it was not unusual for companies to charge plaintiffs ten
to fifteen-percent per month in addition to other fees and minimum
charges. 244 "The advent of competition and an organization such as
ALFA, establishing and utilizing best practices, has brought these
charges down substantially. 245 ALFA's optimism is based on two pre-
dictions: (1) the entrance of more institutionally financed companies into
the market (i.e. banks and traditional lending organizations); and (2)
ALFA members' increased ability to achieve overall lower capital costs,
due to the banking industry's greater industry knowledge.24 6
It is unclear whether reality will reflect ALFA's optimism.
ALFA's optimism is premised on a contingency that, as of present, has
not come to fruition. What are plaintiff-borrowers, consumer protection
groups, and legislators supposed to do in the interim? Abandon efforts
to regulate and "wait and see," while the financing industry continues to
create windfalls for itself at the plaintiff-borrowers' expense? Moreo-
ver, the financing industry has not provided a timeframe during which
this claimed change will occur. How long must regulation advocacy
groups wait? Finally, what if the financing industry is incorrect and the
market does produce as anticipated? Conditioning plaintiff-borrower
protection on a contingency would be unwise in light of the other availa-
ble regulatory options.
C. ALFA Self-Regulation
As previously intimated, in a novel regulatory approach, or perhaps
in an attempt to stave off third-party regulation, the litigation finance
industry recently organized itself into ALFA, a national trade organiza-
242. ALFA FAQs, supra note 38 (estimating that, on average, the "true cost of doing business"
exceeds thirty-percent per annum).
243 Id.
244. Id.
245. Id.
246. Id. ("As the industry continues to mature, ALFA expects rates will continue to fall with
more institutionally financed companies entering the marketplace. In addition, it is hoped that the
more knowledgeable the banking community becomes about non-recourse funding, the greater the
probability that ALFA Members will be able to achieve overall lower costs of capital. Those costs
savings will be passed along to the clients in the form of lower rates.").
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tion aimed at standardizing industry practices, raising industry standards,
and improving its overall image. 247 Based in New York, ALFA was
formed in response to New York State Attorney General Eliot Spitzer's
investigation into a current ALFA member.248 While "[n]o charges of
wrongdoing were brought .... [the investigation] determined that more
could be done to protect consumers. '249 Accordingly, eleven national
litigation financing companies voluntarily launched ALFA and have
agreed to structure their business practices pursuant to terms proposed
by Spitzer's office.250 Harvey Hirschfeld, ALFA Chairman and an exec-
utive vice president at New York-based Plaintiff Funding Corp., a group
which does business nationally as LawCash, reflected, "[t]here is a con-
cern in the industry that people are charging exorbitant rates and giving
the industry a bad name . . . . If done properly, [financing] can serve a
solid purpose."' Spitzer echoed Hirschfeld's optimism, noting that the
establishment of ALFA will "fundamentally change the manner in
which these personal injury litigation cash advances are offered and
negotiated so that consumers can make more informed decisions. '252
The fifteen-member organization writes that its members are "col-
laboratively working together to establish industry standards in the
Legal Finance industry, especially regarding transparency in transactions
and clear disclosure to consumers. ' 253  ALFA's stated goal "is to
increase membership so that consumers throughout the U.S. can trust
that reputable and fair Legal Finance is accessible when they need it."'254
To achieve this goal, ALFA has been working with the New York Attor-
ney General's Office, proposing reforms to protect consumers and the
industry's integrity. Proposed reforms include:
Clear and conspicuous disclosure statements regarding the cash
advance, including the total amount of the cash advance; an
itemization of one-time fees such as application, processing, broker
and attorney review fees; the annualized rate of return on the cash
advance; and the total amount to be repaid; broken down in six
month intervals, carried forward to 36 months;
247. Dee McAree, Legal Cash-Advance Businesses Form Group: Industry Seeks Better Image;
Lawyers Skeptical, THE NAT'L LAW J., Vol. 27, No. 29 (March 28, 2005), at 4.
248. Id.
249. Id.
250. Id.
251. McAree, supra note 247.
252. Press Release, Office of New York State Attorney General Eliot Spitzer, Personal Injury
Cash Advance Firms Agree to Reforms (Feb. 28, 2005), available at www.oag.state.ny.us/press/
2005/feb/feb28a_05.html.
253. ALFA About Legal Finance, http://americanlegafin.com/alfasite2/aboutlegal-finance.
asp (last visited Feb. 20, 2006).
254. Id.
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• A five-business day right to cancel the contract without obligation
or penalty;
" A notarized acknowledgment by the consumer's attorney that the
contract has been reviewed and explained to the client;
• For English and Spanish-speaking consumers, contracts written in
the same language in which the oral negotiations were conducted.
For consumers whose primary language is neither English [n]or
Spanish, a translation of the principal terms into their native
language.255
Despite its relatively recent establishment, ALFA is already draw-
ing critics, particularly consumer and legal groups and plaintiffs' attor-
neys.256 These critics have taken issue with the overall concept of
litigation financing, especially the high interest fees financing compa-
nies charge, with many critics doubting whether entering into such an
agreement is in the client's best interest. 7
Due to ALFA's relative youth, analyzing its effect and potential for
success in achieving its stated goals is mere speculation. On the one
hand, there is reason to believe that early criticisms are misplaced and
that ALFA will achieve its goals. In particular, the member organiza-
tions appear to have premised ALFA membership on the maxim
"strength is found in numbers." In ALFA's case, strength is found in a
partnership and an understanding between the litigation financing com-
pany and the plaintiff's attorney, supervised by some form of govern-
ment presence.
However, ALFA's goals and mission fail to make lowering exces-
sive interest fees a priority, which appears to be the essence of the
debate over the legality and ethics of such financing arrangements.
Regardless of how frequently disclosure is conducted, who conducts dis-
closure, and who witnesses disclosure, financing companies continue to
charge excessive interest fees at the plaintiff-borrowers' expense.
Repairing the industry's image among consumers and making financing
more accessible will do little to lower finance fees.
Furthermore, ALFA's limited geographical reach and slight indus-
try representation may result in its downfall. While the member organi-
zations conduct business nationwide, ALFA itself is based in New York
and supervised by the New York Attorney General's Office.258 As a
result of this relationship, New York citizens' particular concerns will
255. Spitzer, supra note 252.
256. Id.
257. See, e.g., Fla. Bar Op. 00-3 (March 15, 2002), 2002 WL 463991, at *4 ("The terms of the
funding agreements offered to clients may not serve the client's best interests in many
instances.").
258. See ALFA About Legal Finance, supra note 253; Spitzer, supra note 252.
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maintain precedence in ALFA's agenda. New Yorkers' concerns may
not correspond with consumer concerns in other states. Thus, the risk
exists that ALFA's proposals and reforms will cater directly and exclu-
sively to New Yorkers.
Similarly, ALFA's current size suggests that the fifteen member
organizations may have bitten off more than they can chew. At present,
at least one-hundred litigation financing companies exist in the United
States.259 It does not follow that fifteen of these organizations can easily
gain control over and impose standards for a much larger and more
diverse industry.
VII. CONCLUSION
Undoubtedly, litigation financing companies serve a vital need by
providing financial assistance to plaintiffs during the pendency of their
claims. Litigation is costly and the fight is not always one of equals.
Regardless of the strength of her cause of action, a plaintiff may need
financial assistance to pay medical bills and other living expenses. Una-
ble to obtain such assistance from her attorney or traditional lenders, the
plaintiff may turn to financing companies for the necessary advances.
Despite serving this need, financing companies have been the sub-
ject of criticism from consumer protection groups, plaintiffs' attorneys,
courts, and legislators, citing concerns of champerty, usury, unconscio-
nability, and potential ethical violations. However, without an existing
and effective regulatory mechanism by which to protect plaintiff-bor-
rowers against potential abuses, these groups have been and will con-
tinue to be unable to address these concerns via self-regulation. State
legislatures, including the Florida Legislature, must address these con-
cerns or risk placing their potentially vulnerable constituents at the
mercy of litigation financing companies.
259. Doris, supra note 26, at 1.
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